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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Monte Hoisington (“Hoisington”) should not be forced to subject himself to
unconstitutional treatment in order to receive necessary medical care unavailable in
the Special Commitment Center (“SCC”) on McNeil Island, Washington, where he
is civilly detained. By requiring strip and visual body cavity searches before and
after off-island transport and full restraints during transport, past and current
officials of Washington State’s Department of Social and Health Services
(“DSHS”), which operates the SCC, and the Department of Corrections (“DOC”)
(collectively “Defendants”) have chosen to inflict unnecessary, degrading, and
unreasonable procedures on civil detainees when readily available alternatives
exist that satisfy security concerns and do not burden institutional resources.
Rather than consider the sufficiency of these ready alternatives and the
invasive nature of their chosen procedures and their destructive effect on the
SCC’s treatment environment, Defendants ignore the existence of alternative
security measures and argue that this Court should simply defer to their stated
judgment about the necessity of strip and visual body cavity searches and full
restraints. In taking this position, Defendants disregard the less intrusive search
procedures that they themselves developed and instituted after a court order
fourteen years ago forced Defendants to abandon routine strip searches of civil
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detainees following contact visits. Hoisington has presented uncontroverted
evidence that less intrusive search procedures could be used as effectively before
and after off-island transport without infringing on Hoisington’s liberty and
privacy interests.
When reviewed de novo, Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 545 (9th Cir.
2004), with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to, and inferences
drawn in favor of, Hoisington as the non-prevailing party, Sluimer v. Verity, Inc.,
606 F.3d 584, 587 (9th Cir. 2010),1 the lower court’s grant of summary judgment is
inappropriate for the following reasons:
(1) The court committed reversible error by granting summary judgment to
Defendants without addressing Hoisington’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process claim. Though Defendants assert, without citation to authority, that it
is improper for a search to be examined under the Fourteenth Amendment, this
Court did exactly that as recently as 2011. See Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s
Dep't, 629 F.3d 1135, 1139-41 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (strip search challenged
by pretrial detainee as punitive and unreasonable examined under both Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process clause and Fourth Amendment). Hoisington
1

Contrary to Defendants’ argument, Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of
Calif. v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 2010) is inapposite as Hoisington
sufficiently contested the district court’s factual and legal findings throughout his
replacement opening brief. Rep.Ans.Br. 5
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has offered uncontroverted evidence that the policy applied to him is identical to
that applied to prisoners, creating the presumption of punitiveness. The
uncontroverted existence of less intrusive search procedures that would
accommodate his rights at de minimis cost to valid civil commitment interests
demonstrates that Defendants’ policies do not bear a reasonable relationship—and
instead reflect an exaggerated response—to otherwise legitimate security concerns.
Defendants have violated Hoisington’s clearly established Fourteenth Amendment
right as a civil detainee to be free from punitive conditions of confinement.
(2) Subjecting Hoisington to strip and visual body cavity searches violates
his clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches
and seizures. Given the invasiveness of body cavity searches, weighed against the
fact that residents like Hoisington are maintained in a secure environment and
subject to constant guard during off-island trips, this Court requires individualized
reasonable suspicion before a civil detainee can be subjected to a strip and visual
body cavity search. In the alternative, even if individualized reasonable suspicion
is not required, material issues of fact exist with regard to the determination of
reasonableness under Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), making summary
judgment inappropriate.
(3) Though the court below did not reach this question, Defendants
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erroneously assert that summary dismissal of Hoisington’s damages claims against
Defendants in their personal capacities is appropriate based on qualified immunity.
However, qualified immunity does not shield Defendants from liability for
damages because Hoisington has sufficiently alleged violations of his clearly
established rights under the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments. From previous
litigation that resulted in a nearly 13 year court-supervised remedial injunction, the
Defendants were well aware of this clearly established constitutional right of SCC
residents to be free from punitive conditions of confinement and that unreasonable
strip searches of civil detainees violate their Fourth Amendment rights.
(4) To the extent, as claimed by Defendants, that the court below dismissed
all claims against the SCC and DOC officials based on the Eleventh Amendment,
this constitutes error.
Although detained indefinitely, Hoisington is not a prisoner. Though prisonlike, the SCC is not a prison. The Supreme Court and this Court have made clear
that civil commitment cannot be punitive. Upholding the grant of summary
judgment to Defendants would take us another clear and unconstitutional step
toward treating Hoisington more like a prisoner and making the SCC more like
prison. For the reasons we present, the grant of summary judgment must be
overturned.
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ARGUMENT
I.

Subjecting Hoisington to Strip and Visual Body Cavity Searches and
Full Restraints During Off-Island Transport Violates his Clearly
Established Fourteenth Amendment Right Not to Be Punished.
A. The District Court Erred in Failing to Address Hoisington’s
Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claims.
Hoisington challenged the SCC and DOC transportation policy which

mandated strip and visual body cavity searches and full restraints as punitive under
the Fourteenth Amendment and the strip and visual body cavity searches as
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. ER 251. This Court has recognized
that strip searches of pretrial detainees may be punitive under the Fourteenth
Amendment and/or unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Byrd, 629 F.3d at
1139-41 (strip search challenged by pretrial detainee as punitive and unreasonable
examined under both Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and Fourth
Amendment). Cf. Bell, 441 U.S. at 561-62, 558-60.2 Like an individual accused but
not convicted of a crime, civil detainees have a clearly established right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to not be “subjected to conditions that ‘amount to
2

Though the Supreme Court recently examined the reasonableness of strip
searches of a pretrial detainee under the Fourth Amendment as applied to states
under the Fourteenth Amendment, searches in that case were not challenged as
punitive under the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process clause. See
Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S.Ct. 1510
(2012).
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punishment.’” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bell,
441 U.S. at 536).3
Because Hoisington claimed that the policies were punitive in violation of
his Fourteenth Amendment rights, the district court erred in adopting the
magistrate’s report and recommendation, which addressed his Fourth Amendment
challenge but failed to address his Fourteenth Amendment challenge. ER 9-19; see
Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 354 (9th Cir. 1999) (error when district court’s
summary order considered pro se plaintiff’s First Amendment claim but failed to
address Fourteenth Amendment claim).
B.

Defendants' Policies Violate Hoisington’s Clearly Established
Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due
Process Clause to Be Free From Punitive Conditions of
Confinement.

Hoisington’s clearly established right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
be free from punishment was violated by the blanket strip and visual body cavity
searches and full restraints employed when he was transported off-island to receive
necessary medical care. A civil detainee has a clearly established right to more
3

Though Defendants are correct that strip searches of civil detainees have been
examined under the Fourth Amendment, Defendants cite no authority—and
disregard Byrd despite citing earlier to the very page in Byrd where this Court
undertakes its substantive due process analysis—when they conclude it is improper
to review strip searches under the Fourteenth Amendment. Replacement
Answering Brief (“Rep.Ans.Br.”) at 21-22 (citations omitted); id. at 18 (citing
Byrd, 629 F.3d at 1340).
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considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than a prisoner and may not
be punished. Jones, 393 F.3d at 931-32. A presumption of punitiveness arises
when a civil detainee “is confined in conditions identical to, similar to, or more
restrictive than, those in which his criminal counterparts are held.” Id. at 932
(citing Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2000)). Punitive
conditions can also be shown where a challenged restriction is (1) expressly
intended to punish; (2) “excessive in relation to [its non-punitive] purpose”; or (3)
“employed to achieve objectives that could be accomplished in so many alternative
and less harsh methods.” See Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 (citations omitted).4
Prior to transportation off-island, the DOC subjected all SCC residents to the
same invasive strip search procedures used on prisoners in DOC custody. ER 104.
Under the watch of DOC correctional officers, Hoisington was required to strip,
lift his genitals, bend over, and spread his buttocks. ER 252. During transportation,
the DOC subjected Hoisington to the same harsh restraint techniques used on
prisoners. ER 104. Upon return, SCC staff subjected him to the same invasive strip
search procedures. ER 254. Subjecting civil detainees to the same procedures as
4

Defendants apply incorrect test in attempting to rebut Hoisington’s Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process claim by applying Bell’s Fourth Amendment
test against unreasonable searches, Rep.Ans.Br. at 26-29 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at
559), instead of Bell’s due process test, 441 U.S. at 561.
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those used on prisoners creates the presumption of punitiveness. Jones, 393 F.3d
at 932.
Defendants seek to justify their blanket policy based on concerns about
security and contraband. Though maintaining security and reducing contraband are
legitimate non-punitive objectives, the institution’s security and contraband
concerns and the actual risks presented by particular civil detainees must be
accurately assessed. Hoisington is in a secure environment at all times prior to his
departure and has no opportunity to obtain contraband while off-island. ER 8 (full
restraints during transportation, held in a separate compartment on ferry, and
accompanied by armed guards at all times, even during medical procedures).
Further, he has never assaulted SCC staff, possessed contraband, or tried to escape.
ER 9.
Hoisington has presented evidence that the means chosen are punitive under
Jones and Bell because they are excessive in relation to the SCC’s actual security
and contraband concerns and those same concerns can be satisfied through readily
available, less harsh methods. See Jones, 393 F.3d at 934; Bell, 441 U.S. at 561
(punitiveness turns on whether challenged regulations “are rationally related to a
legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and whether they appear excessive in
relation to that purpose”). The existence of ready alternatives to strip and visual

-8-

Case: 10-35917, 06/18/2012, ID: 8218790, DktEntry: 47, Page 17 of 43

body cavity searches – a metal detector, a body-scanning x-ray machine already in
use at the SCC, and pat-down searches – is uncontroverted. ER 58. With strip and
visual body cavity searches following contact visits prohibited by an earlier (now
terminated) court order,5 the SCC has addressed its concerns about security and
contraband by instituting a policy requiring residents to go through a metal
detector before each contact visit and metal detector and body scan after the visit.
ER 33, 58 (citing Washington Department of Social and Health Service Center,
Special Commitment Center Personal Visiting Policy 220, at 7, XII(A), 1992,
available at http://dshs.wa.gov/pdf/SCC/Manuals/p220.pdf) (last visited May 3,
2012)). Defendants do not explain why SCC residents cannot be screened by metal
detector and body scanning x-ray machines during off-island visits. Nor do they
explain why thorough pat-down searches, an alternative DOC search policy used
when a strip search room is unavailable, cannot be used on residents.
Instead, Defendants have chosen to employ unnecessary, humiliating,
degrading procedures identical to those used on prisoners. Defendants have failed
to rebut the presumption that use of these procedures is punitive; their choice of
procedures is punitive under Jones and Bell in violation of Hoisington’s clearly
established right to be free of punitive conditions.
5

See Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1169.
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C.

Defendants Have Failed to Exercise Appropriate Professional Judgment
in Violation of Hoisington’s Clearly Established Right to Receive More
Considerate Treatment and Conditions of Confinement than Criminals.
Defendants’ blanket policy, identical to that used for all Washington State

prisoners, violated Hoisington’s rights as a civil detainee to “more considerate
treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of
confinement are designed to punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22
(1982). Although Youngberg established that decisions by professionals, when
balancing the relevant state interests against the liberty interests of the
involuntarily committed, are presumptively valid, liability may be imposed "when
the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person
responsible did not actually base the decision on such judgment.” Id. at 323.
Defendants, though, have presented no evidence that they have considered
the negative effect that strip and visual body cavity searches have on the SCC’s
treatment environment and on its residents and balanced that against SCC’s
security and contraband concerns in light of the known, readily available
alternatives. This failure of Defendants to consider the effect of strip searches on
SCC’s treatment environment highlights that Defendants are not entitled to
deference under the Youngberg professional judgment standard.
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Hoisington presented uncontroverted evidence that strip searches are
destructive of SCC’s treatment environment. ER 54. In previous litigation
involving conditions of confinement at the SCC, its former clinical director Dr.
Smith referred to strip searches as an abomination. Id. (discussing 1998 Turay
injunction which forbade routine strip searching of SCC residents following
contact visits). Judge Dwyer in Turay found that “[t]he professional opinion is
unanimous that . . . [routine strip searches of residents following every visit] are
not just degrading but profoundly inimical to successful treatment.” Rep.Op.Br.
Addendum Vol. 1 at 43.
Hoisington also presented evidence that strip searches following visits are
inconsistent with existing professional standards for treatment of civilly committed
sex offenders. ER 57. A report submitted by Dr. Fred Berlin in an Illinois case
involving searches of civil detainees stated: “In my professional opinion, these
types of routine strip searches, which at best are based upon both an uncertain and
an unconvincing rational [sic], depart substantially from accepted practice,
judgment, and/or standards, within the field of inpatient mental health treatment.”
ER 92-93.6
6

Defendants attempt to undercut report’s validity by misstating the holding in the
case in which the report was presented. Defendants incorrectly state that the “judge
found that the strip searches . . . complained of by the residents of the Illinois SVP
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Case: 10-35917, 06/18/2012, ID: 8218790, DktEntry: 47, Page 20 of 43

Instead of rebutting Hoisington’s arguments, Defendants misstate a key fact
when they argue that the Inspection of Care Committee (IOCC), an independent
outside monitoring body for the SCC, supports their professional judgment to strip
search residents. Rep.Ans.Br. at 28-29. Defendants incorrectly attribute SCC
official Cathi Harris’s opinion to the IOCC. Compare SER 26 (Harris declaration)
with SER 72-78 (IOCC report) and SER 84 (Defendants correctly attribute
statement to Harris in their summary judgment motion).
Instead of addressing Hoisington’s arguments, Defendants relate sensational
tragic events involving escaped prisoners or treatment appropriate for prisoners.
Rep.Ans.Br. at 23-24; 19-20.7 Defendants’ attention to prisoners and prisons
indicates that prisons and prisoners form an important basis for their judgment in
assessing the SCC’s actual security needs and what treatment is appropriate for
program ‘are not [a] substantial departure[ ] from accepted professional judgment
and standards, and therefore are constitutionally permissible.’”). ER 45 (quoting
Hargett v. Adams, No. 02 C 1456, 2005 WL 399300 at *12 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14,
2005); but see Davis v. Peters, 566 F. Supp. 2d 790, 816 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (citing
Hargett, 2005 WL 399300, at *15) (constitutionality of strip search in Hargett not
reached because plaintiffs’ claims mooted after defendants substituted less
intrusive search procedures). FRAP 32.1 prohibits citation to pre-2007 unpublished
opinions. Our citations are to Defendants’ pleadings and a published case that cite
Hargett.
7
Defendants contend that Hoisington poses a safety risk despite full restraints by
referencing incidents where officials were killed by restrained inmates.
Rep.Ans.Br. at 23-24. However, those incidents involved criminal detainees, with
no leg restraints and less restrictive handcuffs. United States v. Sanders, 994 F.2d
200, 210 n.60 (5th Cir. 1993).
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non-criminal civil detainees.8
The failure of the court below to consider Hoisington’s Fourteenth
Amendment claim constitutes reversible error. The Court should reverse the
District Court's order granting summary judgment for Defendants and remand for
further proceedings under the appropriate legal standard.
II.

Defendants’ Search Policies Violate Hoisington’s Clearly Established
Fourth Amendment Rights.
Hoisington was subjected to repeated, humiliating, and invasive strip

searches that violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 992-93
(9th Cir. 2007), rev'd on other grounds, Hunter v. Hydrick, 129 S.Ct. 2431 (2009),
on remand, Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2012).9

8

Further evidence that Defendants did not appropriately exercise required
professional judgment comes from violation of their own procedures. WAC 388880-110(2) (SCC superintendent or designee “shall determine the use and type of
restraints necessary for each escorted leave on an individual basis”) (emphasis
added). This statute creates a protected liberty interest protected under Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process clause. See Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d
493, 495-97 (1997) (9th Cir. 1997). Defendants’ failure to make individualized
determination with regard to restraints reflects both a failure to exercise required
professional judgment and a procedural due process violation.
9

Defendants misrepresent Bell, Turner, and Hydrick as holding that thorough
searches of SVPs were constitutional. Rep.Ans.Br. at 15. In fact, Bell involved
pretrial detainees, 441 U.S. at 523, and Turner involved prison inmates, Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81 (1987). Further, this Court in Hydrick recognized that
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Because civilly committed individuals are in a wholly different environment
than individuals being processed into the criminal justice system, this Court should
apply a different standard to justify strip searches for civil detainees, allowing strip
searches only on reasonable suspicion. In the alternative, even if the Court were to
apply the standards applicable to criminal detainees in Bell, 441 U.S. at 523,
Defendants' strip search policies are unreasonable intrusions.
A.

Residents Held In Civil Custody Should Not Be Strip Searched
Absent Individualized Suspicion, and the State Did Not Have Any
Reasonable Suspicion that Hoisington Possessed Contraband.

While past courts analyzing the Fourth Amendment rights of civil detainees
have looked to case law regarding the rights of pretrial detainees, see, e.g., Serna v.
Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 952-55 (8th Cir. 2009), the circumstances justifying
searches in those two contexts are materially different and, thus, the Fourth
Amendment standards should be different. Indeed, this Court has recognized that
certain civil detainees should not be subject to strip searches absent reasonable
suspicion.10

civilly committed sex offenders had a clearly established right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 500 F.3d at 992-93.
10

See, e.g., United States v. Handy, 788 F.2d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1986)
(reasonable suspicion required for customs officials for border checkpoint strip
search); United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970)
(same). See also Chehade Refai v. Lazaro, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1112 (D. Nev.
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Courts have repeatedly held that civilly detained individuals are entitled to
protection “at least as great as” the protection granted individuals in the criminal
justice system. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion that Hoisington’s privacy
interests are “considerably more limited” than a pretrial detainee, Rep.Ans.Br. at
16, civil detainees are, in fact, afforded greater protection than detainees in the
criminal justice system. See, e.g., Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 (civil detainees retain
“greater liberty protection than individuals detained under criminal process”).
None of these courts have held that protections afforded civil detainees must be the
same as those afforded individuals detained under criminal process, so the Court is
not be bound to apply Fourth Amendment standards applicable to pretrial
detainees.

2009) (non-admitted aliens); Tungwarara v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1213
(N.D. Cal. 2005) (same); Aiken v. Nixon, 236 F. Supp. 2d 211, 234-35 (N.D. N.Y.
2002) (psychiatric facilities).
Further, Defendants’ reliance on Earls, Block, and Hudson to argue that searches
may be conducted absent reasonable suspicion in other contexts, Rep.Ans.Br. at
17, is misplaced as those cases did not involve strip searches of civil detainees. See
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (prohibition on pretrial detainees' contact
visits); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (prisoners). Contrary to
Defendants’ assertion, the Supreme Court has held that school officials must have
reasonable suspicion before conducting strip searches of students. Compare Bd. of
Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831-32
(2002) (upholding random urine tests of students engaged in extracurricular
activities) (Rep.Ans.Br. at 17) with Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S.
364 (2009) (reasonable suspicion required for strip searching students).
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While Florence held that pretrial detainees may be strip searched without
reasonable suspicion, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of
Burlington, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 1519 (2012), the reasons supporting blanket strip
searches in that case are absent in the context of civil commitment. In Florence,
the analysis focused on the dangers associated with admitting new detainees into
jails. Id. at 1518-19 (explaining how the “admission of inmates” creates numerous
risks for facility staff and the jail population). Due to these concerns, the Court
upheld strip searches without individualized suspicion. Id. at 1520.
While the concerns articulated in Florence may justify blanket strip searches
upon admission to jail, no similar concerns justify strip searches of individuals
already confined in a secure facility. See N.G. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225, 234
(2d Cir. 2004) (strip searching juveniles transferred between secure facilities to
another absent reasonable suspicion violated juveniles' Fourth Amendment rights).
In the present case, residents, like Hoisington, are in a secure environment at all
times. When Hoisington leaves SCC, two armed guards remain with him at all
times, even during medical procedures. ER 8. He is in full restraints during
transportation and held in a separate compartment on the ferry. Id. While Florence
recounted numerous instances in which pretrial detainees smuggled contraband
into jails through oral cavities, 132 S.Ct. at 1521, Defendants offer no evidence
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that contraband has been discovered during off-island transports. ER 12.
Further, in Florence, the Court noted it was reasonable to suspect smuggling
by pretrial detainees “because officials there know so little about the people they
admit at the outset.” Id. at 1521. In contrast, SCC staff know their residents.
Hoisington has lived at the SCC for more than ten years, and SCC staff know he
has never assaulted staff, possessed contraband, or tried to escape. ER 9.
Given the diminished need to search in the controlled environment of the
SCC, as weighed against the extraordinary intrusiveness of a strip search, strip
searches should only be conducted on a showing of reasonable suspicion. See
supra n.8 (listing cases requiring reasonable suspicion prior to strip searches of
civil detainees).11
Defendants had no reasonable suspicion prior to strip searching Hoisington.
Reasonable suspicion supports a search only where there exists “specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (internal
citations omitted). Again, Hoisington has never possessed contraband, assaulted
staff members, or tried to escape, and he is controlled by two guards and shackled
11

Even Bell has been recognized to require “some unarticulated level of
individualized suspicion.” Serna, 567 F.3d at 951 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559)
(fact that defendants' justifications were “general in nature, not specific to
[plaintiff]” weighed against finding search reasonable).
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during every moment off-island. ER 8-9. There was no reason to believe he
possessed or acquired contraband prior to any of the strip searches. Therefore, the
strip searches violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
B.

Even if Individualized Suspicion Is Not Required to Justify a
Visual Body Cavity Search and the Court applies the Bell and
Turner Factors, There Are Genuine Issues of Material Fact as to
Whether Search Was Unreasonable.

Subjecting Hoisington to strip searches violates his Fourth Amendment
rights even under the factors laid out in Bell, and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987), or, at the very least, material issues of fact exist as to whether the searches
were unconstitutional under those factors, making summary judgment
inappropriate. Even without requiring individualized suspicion, this Court has held
that summary dismissal is inappropriate in almost every case in which civilly
detained sex offenders have challenged the constitutionality of strip searches. See,
e.g., Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 992-93 (affirming denial of defendants' motion to
dismiss because material issue of fact existed regarding whether strip searches
violated civilly detained sex offender’s Fourth Amendment rights); Jones, 393
F.3d at 934 (reversing summary judgment for defendants because material issues
of fact existed regarding whether strip searches constituted punitive conditions of
confinement violating civilly committed sex offender’s Fourteenth Amendment
rights); Bacon v. Kolender, Civ.No. 05-0310 , 2007 WL 2669541, at *8 (S.D. Cal.
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2007); Meyers v. Pope, 303 Fed. Appx. 513, 516 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).
The District Court erred in entering summary judgment for Defendants under Bell
and Turner.
1.

Even if Bell applies, the Policies Mandating Strip Searches
Violated Hoisington's Fourth Amendment Rights Because
They are not Reasonably Related to Legitimate Civil
Commitment Objectives in Light of Readily Available
Alternatives.

Contrary to Defendants’ argument, where civilly committed sex offenders
and pre-trial detainees have challenged invasive strip searches, courts have applied
the factors laid out in Bell, not those enumerated in Turner. See, e.g., Demery v.
Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that Turner does not
apply to pretrial detainees because “Turner dealt with convicted prisoners, not
pretrial detainees… [and] involved an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment claim.”); Bacon, 2007 WL 2669541, at *6-8; Serna, 567 F.3d at 949.
When examining the reasonableness of a search under Bell, a court must
consider “(1) the scope of the particular intrusion; (2) the manner in which the
search is conducted; (3) the justification for initiating the search; and (4) the place
where the search is conducted.” 441 U.S. at 559.
As to the first factor, the scope of the particular intrusion is uncontrovertibly
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invasive.12 Whenever Hoisington leaves for and returns from an off-island medical
appointment, he is “instructed to remove all of his clothing lift his genitals and then
bend over and spread his buttocks apart.” ER 252. These types of full strip
searches are, as Hoisington contends, intrusive, frightening, humiliating, and
degrading. See, e.g., Way v. County of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir.
2006) (“strip search is indisputably a ‘frightening and humiliating’ invasion, even
when conducted ‘with all due courtesy.’ Its intrusiveness ‘cannot be overstated.’”)
(internal citations omitted). The scope of the search weighs in favor of a
determination of unreasonableness.
As to the second factor, Hoisington has raised a genuine issue of material
fact with regard to the manner in which the invasive visual body cavity searches
are conducted. Specifically, Hoisington has alleged that, while these searches are
conducted in a separate room, “the door to that room is always open and there has
been up to six staff there.” ER 110. Defendants have not explained why the room
remained open during the search nor why six staff members were present during
the searches. See Way, 445 F.3d at 1160-61 (while ultimately upholding strip
searches of pretrial detainees, noting that the searches took place in a private room,
behind closed doors, with no one present but the officers conducting the search);
12

Neither the Magistrate, nor the District Court, addressed the intrusiveness of the
strip searches. ER 1-2,11.
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Serna, 567 F.3d at 954 (upholding strip search of civilly committed sex offenders
where searches were conducted in private bathrooms, not in public or semi-public
areas, with no extraneous personnel present); Byrd, 629 F.3d at 1143-45 (finding
search of pretrial detainee unreasonable, in part because “ten to fifteen nonparticipating officers” were present). Instead of addressing the absence of privacy
during these searches, the State simply asserts that “the searches are conducted in a
manner so as to provide the resident with as much privacy as possible.”
Rep.Ans.Br., at 26. No explanation is given as to why more privacy is not possible.
Accordingly, the district court erred when it found that there were “insufficient to
support a claim that the manner and scope of the searches [were] unconstitutional.”
ER 11.
As to the third Bell factor, Hoisington has raised genuine issues of material
fact as to whether either of the two visual body cavity searches—prior to his
departure and upon his return— is justified, given the other security procedures
taken by the SCC and the availability of other, less intrusive alternatives. Prior to
transport off-island, Hoisington resides in a secure facility, and residents do not
“try to take any kind of contraband on an off island medical trip.” ER 56.
Defendants fail to indicate what types of contraband Hoisington could possess that
would warrant a strip search prior to off-island trips, and cite no reports of
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residents possessing harmful contraband.
Hoisington has also challenged the need for visual body cavity searches after
he returns to the SCC after medical visits. Specifically, he has asserted that
residents have no way of obtaining contraband during any off-island trips. During
each trip, Hoisington “has two [armed] guards next to him at all times… never
leaves the eyesight of the guards.”13 ER 56. The guards remain with him even
during his medical procedures. ER 8. Furthermore, he “is in belly restraints, and
can only move his hand three inches or less.” ER 56. Given these limitations,
Hoisington questions whether “a nurse or doctor could or would hand a resident
drugs or a weapon.” Id. Hoisington has never tried to escape,14 he has no record of
drugs or contraband while at SCC, and there is no evidence that contraband has
been found on any SCC residents following strip searches. ER 12, 56. Defendants
provide no explanation for why it is necessary to strip search Hoisington when he
has no means or opportunity to obtain contraband during off-island transport.
Instead, the State has offered only generalized security and safety

13

Hoisington is held in separate compartment during ferry rides. ER 8.
Defendants’ only example of an attempted “escape” twenty-one years ago,
Rep.Ans.Brief, 24, involved an individual who was neither handcuffed, shackled
nor in SCC custody. Turay v. Cunningham, Civ.No. 10–5493m 2011 WL 1085897,
*6 (describing incident where resident shackled and cuffed after attempted escape).
14
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justifications for the strip searches.15 However, a general invocation of security
concerns cannot satisfy Bell. Bacon, 2007 WL 2669541 at *7. When defendants in
Bacon asserted that similar searches “were in furtherance of the jail
administration’s legitimate goal of jail security,” the court found that it did not
have the “facts to determine whether Defendants’ policies were ‘reasonably
related’ to maintaining jail security.” Id. Without a “showing of whether these
[SVPs] have access to contraband” the factual record was deemed insufficient and
summary judgment in favor of the defendants improper. Id. Compare Florence,
132 S.Ct. at 1521 (upholding strip searches of pretrial detainees in light of concrete
evidence that contraband had been found during strip searches of such detainees).
Defendants failed to produce any evidence “that any resident has tried to
smuggle any type of illegal contraband in or out of the institution.” Id. at 53.
Instead, to support its assertions about contraband and justify strip searches,
Defendants points to several news articles addressing contraband at SCC. ER 190
n.3. However, these articles suggest that staff members were responsible for
15

Defendants argue generally that strip searches are necessary to protect state
employees, the safety needs of the community through which he is transported, and
others because “contraband is an identified problem at the SCC” and criminal
history of SCC residents. Rep.Ans.Br. 16,20,27. While these justifications might
be sufficient to warrant some safety procedures, they offer little support for routine
strip searches, especially given the restraints and circumstances of off-island
transport that limit detainees’ access to contraband.
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bringing forbidden items to residents.16 Accordingly, even if contraband is a
serious concern, further factual inquiry is necessary to determine whether the strip
search policy actually addresses the problem.
While Defendants argue that facilities in Iowa, Illinois, and Florida conduct
strip searches, Rep.Ans.Br. at 8, they fail to show whether the programs, facilities,
and policies in those facilities are adequately analogous to those at the SCC, i.e.,
whether strip searches are conducted in conjunction with the use of armed guards
and restraints and both prior to and after all trips outside the facility; and whether
concrete evidence of smuggling existed to justify the searches.
Finally, in assessing the reasonableness of the Defendant's strip search
policy under Bell, the Court must consider the availability of less invasive
alternatives that could have adequately met the safety and security objectives cited
by Defendants. See, e.g., Serna, 567 F.3d at 955 (“[I]t is proper for courts to
consider the availability of simple, safe, and less invasive techniques that officers
elected not to pursue when assessing the reasonableness of performing body cavity
searches en mass on a treatment center population”). As described supra, there are
16

See Levi Pulkkinen, “Sex predator sentenced for smuggling crack into
Commitment Center,” SEATTLE PI, March 25, 2010,
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Sex-predator-convicted-of-smuggling-crackinto-892950.php (reporting on SCC staff member who smuggled cocaine into
facility for detained sex offender).
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a number of alternatives available at SCC: first, the existing DOC policy used by
SCC requires officials to conduct two thorough pat searches in lieu of a strip
search in “areas without a secured area for a strip search.” ER 133.The express
inclusion of this alternative makes clear that it satisfies Defendants’ security
concerns.17 Second, SCC already has and uses a full body x-ray scanner and a
metal detector, canine searches, pat/frisk searches, and hands-on inspection
procedures.18 The district court erred by failing to consider any of these
alternatives in determining the reasonableness of the strip searches. Because
Defendants failed to meet their burden by showing that less invasive search
methods are not available or otherwise deficient, summary judgment was
inappropriate.
The fourth Bell factor, which considers the place where the search is
conducted, was addressed above, in the discussion of the second factor, the manner
in which the search is conducted. See Bacon, 2007 WL 2669541, at *6.
2.

The District Court Erred in Finding that the SCC Policy
Was Valid Under Turner.

As discussed supra, the Turner test should not be applied in the civil
commitment context. However, even if this court finds it necessary to run the four17

In fact, Defendants cited with approval the use of “thorough pat down searches”
in an Arizona facility for detained sex offenders. Rep.Ans.Br. at 8; ER 7.
18
ER 33, 58; see SCC Personal Visiting Policy 220, at 7.
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step Turner test, the outcome should mirror that under the Bell test. See Rep.Op.Br.
at 24-27, 51-54.
III.

The Defendants Are Not Shielded by Qualified Immunity on
Hoisington's Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and Material
Issues of Fact Exist with Regard to Whether Defendants Violated His
Clearly Established Rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Hoisington seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary

damages, ER 11-12, and Defendants cannot claim qualified immunity as to his
claims for equitable relief. See Hydrick, 669 F.3d at 939-40. The defense of
qualified immunity would apply, if at all, only with regard to Hoisington's claims
for monetary damages, id., and material issues of fact exist with regard to whether
such immunity applies to Hoisington's money damages claims.
Qualified immunity does not shield government officials if the plaintiff
shows (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) that
the right was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct. See
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011).
First, as described supra Parts II and III, Hoisington has sufficiently argued
that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by imposing conditions of his
confinement and strip searches that violate his Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment
rights. See ER 254-55. This Court in Hydrick and Jones held that civilly detained
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sex offenders possess clearly established rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 988-1000; Jones, 393 F.3d at 932. Because
material issues of fact exist as to whether the Defendants' policies violated those
rights, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment.
Second, Hoisington's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures and his Fourteenth Amendment rights to non-punitive
conditions of confinement have been clearly established. See Jones, 393 F.2d at
932; see also Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 932 (reversing entry of summary judgment for
defendants on ground that material issues of fact existed with regard to whether
strip searches and shackling constituted punitive conditions of confinement); 19
Meyers, 303 Fed. Appx. at 516 (vacating summary judgment for defendants on
civilly detained SVP's Fourteenth Amendment claims on ground that his
substantive due process rights were “clearly established” when he was detained
and strip searched in county jail in 2002). Further, in Hydrick, this Court refused to
dismiss an action brought by civilly committed sex offenders, reasoning that
19

This Court in Hydrick later dismissed plaintiffs' damages claims on qualified
immunity grounds because the complaint failed to allege any “specific policy
implemented by the Defendants or a specific event or events instigated by the
[supervisory] Defendants.” 669 F.3d at 939 (emphasis in original). Here,
Hoisington has sufficiently alleged a specific policy that Defendants implemented
or maintained. See ER 247-49. We note that this Court in Hydrick upheld
plaintiffs’ claims for equitable relief. Id. at 941.
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subjecting them to unreasonable strip searches would violate their clearly
established Fourth Amendment. 500 F.3d at 992-93.
Defendants, charged with the custody of civilly committed sex offenders,
should have been well aware of this Court's unequivocal rulings in Hydrick and
Jones that individuals civilly detained as sexually violent predators possess clearly
established rights against unreasonable, punitive, and excessive strip searches and
other conditions of confinement. Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 988-1000; Jones, 393 F.3d
at 932. While Defendants appear to argue that they could have reasonably believed
their strip searches were lawful under Michenfelder, Bell, and Richmond,
Rep.Ans.Br., at 41-42, those cases upheld strip searches of individuals in the
criminal justice system, not individuals in civil detention. See Michenfelder, 860
F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1988) (prisoner in maximum security facility); Bell, 441
U.S. at 558 (pretrial detainees); Richmond v. City of Brooklyn Ctr., 490 F.3d 1002,
1006-07 (8th Cir. 2007) (same). Defendants could not have reasonably relied on
case law applicable to individuals in the criminal context when this Court has made
clear that civilly detained SVP's cannot be “confined in conditions identical to [or]
similar to” detainees in the criminal context and that strip searches must be
reasonable. Jones, 393 F.3d at 932.
Further, Defendants appear to argue that they could have reasonably
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believed that their shackling and strip searches of Hoisington were valid under the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2002).
Rep.Ans.Br. at 42. However, not only is Thielman not the law of this Circuit, but
Thielman did not challenge the range or severity of deprivations alleged by
Hoisington, e.g, strip searches and handcuffs with full restraints, and the Court
accordingly dismissed his claims as “the stuff of nickels and dimes.” Id. at 484.
The humiliating and degrading conditions that Hoisington was subject to, unlike
those in Thielman, is hardly “the stuff of nickels and dimes.” Id.
IV.

Hoisington’s Claims for Prospective Relief Are Not Barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.
While a damages suit against defendants in their official capacities is barred

by the Eleventh Amendment, state officials may be sued in their official capacities
under the Eleventh Amendment when seeking a prospective injunctive remedy for
a continuing violation of federal law. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160
(1908). Hoisington has made clear that he is suing the defendants (1) in their
official capacities for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief and (2) in their
individual capacities for damages. ER 39, 67, 247-250. Because Hoisington’s
official capacity claim for prospective relief to remedy an ongoing violation of
federal law, it is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as the court implicitly
found below. ER 20.
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Defendants incorrectly assert that the court dismissed all claims against them
in their official capacities, Rep.Ans.Br. at 43; it would have been error for the court
to dismiss Hoisington’s claims against the defendants in their official capacities
under the Eleventh Amendment. Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 984 (plaintiffs could
challenge constitutionality of conditions of civil confinement and seek injunctive
and declaratory relief under §1983); Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1171-73 (upholding
injunction to remedy ongoing constitutional violations by SCC).
Further, Defendants claim they “have supplemented the record to clarify that
currently, the SCC – rather than DOC – is supervising the searches and off-island
transportation of residents at the SCC.” Rep.Ans.Br. at 6 n.4. This is incorrect. The
court below, on June 7, 2012, denied Defendants’ motion to supplement the record.
Dist.Ct.Docket #48. While this fact might be considered for judicial notice, it is not
properly before this Court and defendants have not made a sufficient factual that
DOC will not in the future be involved in transporting SCC residents.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to overturn the lower court’s grant
of summary judgment to Defendants. In doing so the Court should rule that, as a
non-criminal detainee, Hoisington has a clearly established right to be free from
strip and visual body cavity searches that are not based on individualized suspicion
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and that the adoption of punitive DOC policies violates Hoisington’s clearly
established right to a constitutionally adequate treatment environment. Finally,
because of the complexity and weightiness of his claims, Hoisington asks the Court
to order that counsel be appointed upon remand. Appointment of counsel below
will permit full consideration of the important constitutional issues raised by
Hoisington. Cf. Jones, 393 F.3d at 937 (counsel appointed on remand for civil
detainee challenging conditions of confinement following successful appeal after
pro bono counsel appointed for appeal); Meyers, 303 Fed.Appx. at 513 (same).
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